what happens if a soldier refuses to go to war

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Justin Colby deserted the US military due to his belief that the war in Iraq was unjust. "The army did a lot of expert things for me. Information technology taught me responsibleness. Simply I won't seize with teeth my tongue anymore and continue doing something I think is wrong."[1] Colby is deemed a deserter, having refused to render to the war in Iraq, a war he no longer believed to exist merely. His case represents one of 3,101 US soldiers who refused to fight in the Usa Coalition in Iraq between 2005 and 2006 alone.[two] Thus representing a growing phenomenon for active armed forces personnel as they deed on their moral bureau by refusing to fight. The alternative class of activity is to apply for conscientious objection status. All the same, applicants face a steep burden of proof demonstrating "business firm, stock-still and sincere objection to participation in the state of war in any form or the bearing of arms, by reason of religious grooming and conventionalities."[3] From 2003-2005, the US approving rate was just over 50 per cent.[4] A core dilemma for combatants is that in that location is no pick for selective careful objection; a refusal to fight on the grounds of "political, philosophical or sociological beliefs,"[5] permitting the unwillingness to fight on moral grounds. Due to restricted legal avenues and lack of rights associated with military refusal, combatants are left with no other choice but to desert.

By focusing on the notion of combatants' right to refuse wars which they deem unjust, this essay will challenge the ethics of but war scholarship using a revisionist framework, effectively determining the extent to which soldiers accept the correct to exist held morally answerable for their participation in an unjust war and, further, take the right to pass up. The first department will explore the justifications of orthodox just war theory and the reasons why combatants under just war theory are denied the right to the moral bureau to determine the justness of state of war. The second section will examine the revisionist justification for the reconciliation of but war principles, reinstating moral agency in combatants. The 3rd section will utilize the example study of the Second Gulf State of war, led by the United states coalition, to assess, first, whether this war satisfied the just state of war doctrine and, second, whether soldiers had an obligation as moral agents to evaluate its failures and refuse to fight. The final department will explore the hierarchy of moral responsibility, last that if moral responsibility is not accounted for in the college tiers of a military command, soldiers have a moral obligation to apply their moral agency in warfare.

Orthodox and Revisionist Merely State of war Theory

The But state of war doctrine sets out robust constraints with the objective of preventing unjust wars and unjust conduct within them. This doctrine has created the upstanding parameters effectually the justness of warfare, as the permissibility of comport in combat through the 2 cardinal principles: 'jus in bello'— permissible conduct in warfare—and 'jus ad bellum' —the ethical justification of pursuing state of war.[half-dozen] Such principles navigate complex moral dilemmas and finer determine the orthodox ideals of war. Jus ad bellum requires, first, a merely cause for resorting to war.[7] 2nd, the necessity for right intent, internationally set out past the United National Security Council every bit peace and security.[viii] Third, last resort, being a reasonable belief that no other option is ethically feasible. Finally, proportionality, whereby the harm caused by going to war outweighs the harm of doing nothing.[9] Jus in bello distinguishes combatants from non-combatants and those hors de combat, deeming combatants morally equal in warfare and requiring the awarding of proportionality and discrimination as the necessary criteria to determine the permissibility of war conduct.[10] The theoretical separation of the two just state of war principles regulates ethical conduct regardless of whether a war is deemed just, to protect combatants and not-combatants inside an armed conflict.[11] Further, this separation denies the moral bureau of combatants, restricting their ability to assess the justness of state of war, focusing solely on their ethical conduct in it.

Restricted Moral Bureau

A leading proponent of the Simply War theory, Michael Walzer, argues that soldiers must remain allowed to moral responsibility outside the scope of jus in bello,[12] deeming this a necessary feature of all warfare—that combatants remain instruments of state of war, not the agents of them, and that moral responsibility and accountability lay with military commanders.[13] "We regard soldiers under orders every bit men whose acts are not entirely their own and whose liability for what they do is somehow macerated."[14] This distinction holds that soldiers are either required to obey lawful orders or turn down those orders which violate jus in bello, the latter representing the mechanism past which combatants can refuse to fight—combat which breaks jus in bello principles. To this end, soldiers accept a moral responsibility to disobey military orders which go confronting the jus in bello criteria of proportionality and bigotry. Farther, Walzer holds combatants morally accountable for violations in jus in bello, for those who have no grounds to merits ignorance or duress.[fifteen] This restricted moral agency prevents soldiers from assessing the justness of the war in which they fight and prevents their right of refusal on such grounds, resulting in desertion as the only recourse for combatants to apply complete moral agency.

Complete Moral Bureau

This theoretical separation has been challenged by just state of war revisionists who propose the reconciliation of just state of war principles to ensure soldiers retain full moral agency in warfare. "This ways that we must end reassuring soldiers that they act permissibly when they fight in an unjust war, provided that they bear themselves honourably on the battleground by fighting in accordance with the rules of appointment."[sixteen] Revisionist theorist Jeff McMahan further advances the claim of moral bureau by extrapolating two core rationales. First, as soldiers, those who fight take a moral obligation to consider the justness of the war in which they fight. Second, on the grounds of jus advertising bellum, combatants have a correct to refuse to fight in a war which is deemed unjust. "Their vocation is not simply morally important but besides morally perilous; they must seek to understand the moral constraints by which information technology's governed."[17] Past applying this moral judgement, McMahan distinguishes 'just soldiers' from 'unjust soldiers', arguing that those who fight a just war remain morally innocent.[eighteen] McMahan further contends that the military has a moral imperative to educate combatants on the ethics of warfare, and not only railroad train them to fight. Such moral education would equip combatants with the means to judge whether their war is just. While advocating for a college degree of combatant education, McMahan does not deny the existing degree of capacity and rationality within soldiers to employ this moral judgement.[xix]

This revisionist approach to moral agency changes the telescopic of their moral responsibility in warfare, encouraging a necessary caste of circumspection when participating in a war which cannot satisfy the jus ad bellum criteria. This moral agency, therefore, emancipates combatants from their condition as instruments of warfare, past protecting their right to reject to fight in an unjust war based on the jus advert bellum criteria, not only on the ground of violations in jus in bello. McMahan'southward revisionist argument postulates a greater obligation to the higher moral skilful; beingness a simply cause, than a combatant's obedience to authority and adherence to the rules of engagement. "We must insist that they too recognize their ain moral autonomy and abandon the comforting fiction that all responsibility for acts they practise in obedience to commands lies with those who control them, and so that it is only when they disobey, or when they breach the norms governing their professional activity equally warriors, that they become responsible for wrongdoing."[20]

Combatants' Moral Inequality

Walzer provides three distinct justifications for combatant'south amnesty from jus ad bellum, recognised through the theoretical separation of the just state of war principles. First, by challenge combatants to exist analogous to boxers, Walzer argues that combatants retain moral equality on the battlefield. Like boxers, combatants accept consented to participate in gainsay and thus accept given up their rights to not beingness harmed. Further, their lack of agency to make up one's mind warfare make them equal. "These human instruments … are 'poor sods, just like me', trapped in a war they didn't make. I find in them my moral equals."[21] Finally, due to the relative symmetry of combatants in warfare and the moral ambiguity of their just crusade, they should be deemed moral equals. McMahan contests this consent model as, get-go, combatants who consent to fight, do not agree to be killed. Second, by consenting to war, combatants have non universally consented to all further warfare. Such universal consent implies a contractual commitment to combatant status without recourse to challenging their participation despite changes in the moral nature of war.[22] Therefore consent should be dynamic to represent the necessary reassessment of jus ad bellum required by combatants during state of war.[23] McMahan farther refutes the notion of the moral equality of combatants, determining that the cause for which they fight, distinguishes only soldiers from unjust combatants, rendering those who fight in an unjust war morally unequal every bit they have no legitimate targets.[24] Further, while Walzer claims that "the doctrine of the moral equality of combatants holds that combatants aren't responsible for whether their state of war is only,"[25] McMahan argues that moral responsibility cannot be alienated from a combatant and their ability to utilise moral sentence.

Commitment to an Unjust Institution

2d, orthodox just state of war theory prevents soldiers' refusal to fight on the grounds of jus ad bellum, effectively preserving their moral immunity, due to the notion of institutional commitment. Combatants retaining their moral agency would jeopardise the stability of the armed forces institutional framework, an institution to which they have a moral duty.[26] Recognising this debate, Frowe notes that "combatants as well have a moral duty to follow orders. This moral duty arises from their obligation to their institution: they have committed themselves to fight for the military, and morality requires them to fulfil this commitment."[27] Using the analogy of the criminal justice system, Walzer renders obedience to a just institution fundamental despite isolated cases of injustice.[28] McMahan renders this analogy objectionable, as it first assumes that the institution is in and of itself, inherently but and incorruptible. Second, it assumes those in public office don't pursue war for private or instrumental gain. Third, McMahan argues that due to the fiscal and human costs of war being significantly college than the consequences of isolated injustices within the criminal justice system, those who participate in war should not, nether the pretext of stability, obey an unjust institution without question.[29] Preventing a mechanism for combatant refusal in unjust wars reinforces the continuation of war by lowering the accountability necessary to uphold jus ad bellum. Therefore, civilian commanders, who are not accountable to either populace or those who they send to fight, have the option of determining the scope and application of jus advertisement bellum, with the power to justify an unjust war. So, combatants must remain morally accountable for their participation every bit agents of warfare, not instruments of them.

Moral Consistency

Finally, under jus in bello principles, Walzer reduces combatant moral agency by invoking unquestionable obedience of soldiers to their college bondage of command. This is due to their invincible ignorance; where lack of crucial information conferred to them prevents their ability to decide the justness of armed conflict. Such ignorance, therefore transfers the moral responsibility from soldiers to their superiors, according to Walzer. "The moral responsibility is articulate, and it cannot be located anywhere else than in the function of commander."[30] Jeff Montrose encapsulates this notion by noting that "Soldiers remain objectively ignorant and, as such, can merely hope that their crusade is formally simply. In the terminate, they remain…immune from the guilt of an unjust state of war."[31] However, despite the recognition of this contend, Montrose refutes this claim on the grounds of moral consistency, whereby a combatant's moral responsibility under jus in bello confers the same obligation under jus advertisement bellum.[32] Therefore a combatant'southward moral judgement and responsibility can never be replaced by the claim of ignorance. This supports the Kantian model of ideals, whereby humans remain rational actors, who cannot be degraded to instruments of warfare.[33] Jeff McMahan concurs with this notion, arguing that jus advert bellum tin can be adamant with moral sense and education into the ethics of state of war, so much so that the reasonable combatant should engage with jus advertizing bellum regardless of their rank and has sufficient information to make up one's mind the justness of war.[34] Jeff McMahan further claims that such moral agency is feasible due to the limited amount of belittling skill or but war knowledge required to behave this assessment of justness of war.[35] Ellner et al. further disregards the concept of invincible ignorance on similar grounds, noting that due to sufficient education and access to relevant data inside the public domain, combatants on boilerplate cannot rely on the excuse of ignorance for their participation in an unjust war.[36] "We must cease to regard them as mere instruments or automata and recognise that they are morally autonomous and therefore morally responsible agents."[37]

By refuting the orthodox claims of moral equality, institutional commitment and invincible ignorance, McMahan revises the only war theory to provide the appropriate mechanism for individual combatants to apply complete moral bureau. Past conducting a practical evaluation of this theoretical argue, the next department will appraise whether the war in Republic of iraq satisfied the merely state of war doctrine and second, whether soldiers had an obligation every bit moral agents to evaluate its failures and pass up to fight.

Usa Coalition in Iraq 2003

On the 20^thursday of March, the US assistants announced the showtime of Operation Iraqi Freedom in which the United states of america-led coalition invaded Iraqi territory to disarm Iraq and oust the despot Saddam Hussein. The determination to launch a military intervention came later a terminal straw for some western democratic states, who believed that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed and was continuing their development of Weapons of Mass Devastation (WMD), despite the United nations-sanctioned prohibition. The initial phases of the armed services performance were deemed a success, inside 3 weeks having seized Baghdad and forced Saddam Hussein into hiding, finer dismantling the thirty-twelvemonth dictatorship in Iraq. On the 22^nd of May, the UN passed Resolution 1483, which mandated the United states of america coalition to maintain law and order inside the region which was at present experiencing a severe security vacuum after the toppling of Saddam Hussein's authorities and his capture in December 2003.[38] The The states invasion not only increased political instability and intensified dubiousness over the state'south future but radicalised several insurgent groups who intensified their guerrilla warfare post-2003, with the support of fragmented and hostile regional actors. The security vacuum played a pregnant factor in increasing the instability within Republic of iraq, promoting the continuation of insurgent guerrilla warfare and the creation of a ceremonious war, a war within which the US coalition was now heavily involved.[39]

The Unjust War in Iraq

"As the just war doctrine, forged from painful experience over the centuries, teaches, noble aspirations are non enough. War is and then serious and deadly an occupation that the just war tradition sets the tests for a just war at a high level. Against those high standards, the 2nd Gulf War is constitute to exist wanting."[40] Nether just state of war theory, the Us invasion of Iraq did not fulfil the necessary merely state of war criteria of jus advert bellum initially or as the state of war continued, therefore it represented an unjust war.[41] First, on the grounds of a just cause. While there was a reasonable belief in an imminent threat of WMD in Iraq, in the case of the Usa, at that place was strategic ambiguity as to the main cause of invasion, confusing their 'merely cause.'

Farther 'just crusade' required justification for a pre-emptive attack on the grounds of self-defence. On this basis, the Usa was unable to prove an firsthand or grave threat and only raised their suspicion on it. Second, with the reports from the Un Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) showing prove of increased cooperation of the Iraqi regime, the invasion was not the last resort.[42] The criteria of right intention might be satisfied, as the coalition'due south intent was Iraqi disarmament of WMD and protection of civilians. However, without authorisation from the United Nations Security Council, Operation Iraqi Freedom did not have the international consensus required to satisfy the criteria of legitimate authority. Finally, the requirements of proportionality under jus advertising bellum, which measures whether or not the good achieved will outweigh the harm caused, effectively failed, due to the lack of rigorous considerations of the potential negative consequences of the invasion.[43] Furthermore, the lack of sufficient planning of appropriate post-conflict reconciliation and institution-building meant that the coalition failed on the grounds of jus post bellum proportionality also.[44]

Moral Accountability Under Jus in Bello

According to orthodox just war theory, assessing the justness of the United states coalition military intervention remained beyond the scope of soldiers and their commitment to combat in Iraq. Their only moral obligation was to ensure that jus in bello was satisfied, maintaining just conduct in warfare. While failures in this moral obligation would consequence in their moral accountability, maintaining an unjust state of war was never a notion to exist questioned by combatants. The extent of moral accountability for soldiers in the Republic of iraq war was attributed to those who violated jus in bello principles of proportionality and not-combatant immunity. For example, in 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility, Usa soldiers committed "sadistic, breathy, and wanton criminal abuses"[45] against Iraqi detainees, exhibiting violations in the jus in bello criteria of non-combatant amnesty. 9 army soldiers were convicted for such state of war crimes.[46]

Moral Amnesty

Walzer further condemned the Republic of iraq state of war based on violations of jus in bello proportionality and discrimination. Such violations served as show of a more significant systemic outcome, the continuation of an unjust war. Even so, based on their invincible ignorance, moral equality and institutional commitment, combatants remained morally allowed to moral accountability for their participation in such a war.[47] This chasm of moral agency demonstrates a profound contradiction in merely state of war theory, whereby, the moral restrictions placed on combatant'southward agency to determine jus advertising bellum contradicts the expectation of combatants' ethical agency in conduct. Therefore, this theoretical separation of just war principles demonstrates moral inconsistency.

Beyond the disproportional atrocities committed, jus in bello proportionality, which dictates that "the corporeality of destruction permitted in pursuit of a war machine objective must be proportionate to the importance of the objective,"[48] failed due to the rate of civilian casualties, those innocent of and finer hors de gainsay.[49] Within the first year of the state of war, civilian casualties amounted to 12,133, significantly increasing to 29,525 in 2006 — the estimated total civilian casualties being between 183,669 – 206,273 according to the Republic of iraq Body Count.[fifty] Under the doctrine of double effect, these deaths were deemed 'tragic' all the same permissible, whereby military machine necessity and success of the mission outweighed the collateral impairment caused.[51] Notwithstanding, due to the Iraq war failing the just state of war principle of jus ad bellum, the purpose itself was not simply and could not justify the charge per unit of non-combatant deaths. Further, Walzer criticised the US coalition on its failure to ensure moral equality in gainsay due to the reliance of airstrikes, missiles and bombs, effectively taking US combatants out of the line of fire. Such military tactics violated the doctrine of moral equality and failed jus in bello discrimination, as "justice in war requires our side to accept risks in social club to provide the highest reasonable level of protection for civilians on the other side."[52] Both cases represented systemic failures of not only jus in bello proportionality and bigotry simply also represented the systemic failure of the war itself. However, due to the theoretical separation of just war principles, such failures fell outside the scope of combatant accountability — combatants, who as instruments of war and not agents of them, were immune to such moral responsibility.

Combatant Responsibility in an Unjust State of war

Revisionist scholars concur with Walzer'southward assessment that the war in Iraq was overall unjust. Nevertheless, revisionists fence that combatants were non immune to moral responsibility for their participation in an unjust war on the grounds of moral equality, institutional commitment or invincible ignorance. Considered past McMahan as unjust soldiers, US combatants had no legitimate targets and were thus morally answerable for the deaths acquired.[53] Revisionist scholars further criticised Us combatants' obedience to what was widely considered an unjust war, arguing that soldiers had a greater responsibility to employ moral judgement earlier their connected participation in the Republic of iraq war. Such evaluation did not fall beyond the scope of a rational agent. Finally, revisionist scholars applauded those labelled deserters for their commitment to a higher moral cause and their refusal to fight in a state of war deemed unjust. Soldiers such every bit Joshua Key, who deserted to Canada subsequently serving for eight months in Iraq, a war which he believed was wrong, claiming that "I broke the rules because I had a conscience".[54] Or, similarly, like Sergeant Kevin Benderman, who, after seeing the horrors of war, wanted to apply for careful objection but was instead charged with desertion.[55] Such cases, for revisionists, represented the appropriate scope of moral agency, whereby soldiers applying jus advert bellum considered the war in Republic of iraq unjust, and, upon such grounds, refused to fight.

The just war doctrine has legitimised and institutionalised the prevention of unjust war, not merely unjust conduct inside them. The right of refusal reinstates a moral obligation to all who participate in warfare, one which revisionists claim is a necessary status of just war doctrine, a doctrine whose purpose has been damaged by the separation of just state of war principles. Due to the war in Republic of iraq, declining both principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, McMahan expands the notion of careful objection, to that of "selective conscientious refusal to fight."[56] It becomes a notion whereby soldiers are compelled to empathise the moral constraints placed on warfare, warfare to which they are not morally allowed, and must practice their moral bureau and right to refuse participation in what is deemed an unjust war. Recognising the complexities of assessing whether or non a war is just places a higher moral responsibleness on combatants to do caution. To this end, May Larry argues that "soldiers, and their leaders, should be very reluctant to appoint in war since it is so hard to figure out whether any given state of war is a just war."[57]

Bureaucracy of Moral Responsibility

The near compelling rationale for the absence of moral agency in soldiers and  the concurrent limitations in their right of refusal relies on the but war notion of institutional stability.[58] To retain democratic legitimacy, combatants must uphold their institutional delivery, as those who decide to go to war must exist civilian commanders voted into political office,[59] those democratically accountable to the people. Such accountability renders them the nigh appropriate to determine when to go to war, a decision which cannot be made on arbitrary grounds of combatant disposition or subjective justification.[60] Adhering to orthodox just war theory, Andrew Milburn argues that as autonomous representatives, Congress should hold jus advertizing bellum rights; thus, it should hold the decision-making authorization of whether to go to war. However, through addressing the current failures in the execution of the jus advertizement bellum office by the legislature, Milburn proposes an institutional transfer of moral responsibleness to military officers, who have sworn a higher moral oath to the constitution, not an oath of obedience to noncombatant commanders.[61] This moral agency, he argues, should exist to extend the checks and balances required in light of the failings of the Congress to fulfil this role.[62] Echoing Walzer's notion of responsibleness, Milburn argues that military commanders have the capacity and responsibility to propose Congress on issues pertaining to unjust warfare, and can confer valuable information on the extent to which a war may not fulfil jus ad bellum. Further, they have a moral obligation to speak out against the instance of unjust warfare. "The military professional plays a primal role every bit a check and balance at the indistinct juncture between policy and military strategy… when faced with a moral dilemma, the military officer non only has grounds for dissent but also, if his code of ethics and oath of part and then guide, has a duty to disobey".[63]

This echoes McMahan's revisionist claim past extending the right to determine jus ad bellum to military personnel while non disregarding Walzer's notion of hierarchical responsibility. The nexus between orthodox and revisionist only war lies in the extent to which the hierarchy of responsibility exists. As Jeff Montrose postulates, "This responsibleness to deed according to censor is not limited to the lowest individual on the battlefield. Information technology too applies beyond all levels of the military hierarchy."[64] Concurring with this notion, Miller recognises the varying degrees of responsibility and ignorance within the armed services hierarchy. To this end, the degree to which armed services officers should be held morally responsible is college than that of a young inexperienced combatant, due to the comparative inexperience on the part of the soldier.[65]

Upon assessing the two simply war debates, this essay draws upon this hierarchy of responsibleness to examine the extent to which soldiers should have the right to moral agency. To bridge the chasm of agency, this essay argues that combatants should exercise their moral agency when the moral responsibleness to attach to jus ad bellum is non fulfilled by their superiors. The chain of control, therefore, represents a bureaucracy of decision-making and presents a legitimate mechanism by which moral agency should be executed (Refer to Figure 1: Pyramid of Moral Responsibility). A lack of moral authority demonstrated within the chain of command to utilize sufficient moral agency gives combatants the right and moral obligation to execute their moral agency and determine the justness of a war. This agency brings with it a moral responsibility to turn down to fight an unjust war due to: first, the need to act every bit the necessary cheque and balance on authority; 2nd, their correct to be morally accountable for their actions; and finally, their oath to the constitution, to uphold their morality in warfare overriding obedience in it. With evident failures in moral responsibility in the higher concatenation of command, combatants accept the right to practice "selective careful refusal,"[66] on the grounds of "political, philosophical or sociological beliefs".[67] This would reclassify deserters as moral agents, those who have seen the horrors of war, understood the unjustness of the war and exercised their right to refuse.

Conclusion

Through a closer examination of the orthodox only war theory, this essay has criticised the separation of only war principles, effectively challenging the notions of moral equality, institutional commitment and invincible ignorance, which renders soldiers immune to moral responsibility in an unjust state of war. Using a revisionist theoretical framework, this essay proposed the reconciliation of the only state of war principles to reinstate moral agency in soldiers and their right to selective conscientious refusal if the war in which they fight is unjust. Nether merely war theory, the state of war in Iraq was non simply unjust only also failed on the grounds of jus in bello. Proponents of orthodox just war theory attributed moral accountability to combatants to jus in bello, rendering them allowed to the systemic failures of the unjust war. While revisionists held combatants morally accountable for their participation in an unjust war, effectively reinstating their moral agency. To reconcile the division in just state of war theory, this essay proposed a Pyramid of Moral Responsibleness (Refer to Effigy 1) which requires the execution of combatants' moral agency through selective conscientious refusal, thus a transfer of moral responsibility, in light of the failures of jus ad bellum conclusion-making by their superiors.

The right to complete moral agency proposed in this essay would bring axiomatic applied concerns, every bit noted by Jeff McMahan.[68] However, the focus of this essay has been to address the normative concerns of orthodox simply war theory and to revise the current just state of war theory in light of its limitations. Due to the normativity of this argument, practical limitations and issues of this theory autumn beyond the scope of this essay. Further research would be required to address such practical concerns, and to accost how combatants' moral agency could exist legitimately executed within the armed services institution, whereby selective conscientious refusal would not autumn prey to abuse but legally exist within an institutional framework. Despite its limitations, this essay recognises that such moral agency will fundamentally modify the nature of the armed services, effectively making it more challenging to go to state of war. However, this bureau, therefore, fulfils the fundamental purpose of the merely state of war doctrine, to ensure the necessary restrictions to foreclose unjust wars.

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Notes

[1] Deam, Jenny. 'Soldiers' choice: Fight or flight' The Denver Post, April, 2007 https://www.denverpost.com/2007/04/xiii/soldiers-selection-fight-or-flight/ (Accessed June eleven, 2019)

[2] Ibid

[3] Cotton, Jess, 'The Good Soldier' The White Review, Oct, 2013 http://www.thewhitereview.org/feature/the-good-soldier/ (Accessed June xi, 2019)

[four] Army Public Affairs "Careful Objectors" U.s.a. Army, https://www.army.mil/article/4267/conscientious_objectors (Accessed Baronial 28, 2019)

[v] Deam, Jenny. 'Soldiers' choice: Fight or flight' The Denver Post, April, 2007 https://world wide web.denverpost.com/2007/04/13/soldiers-selection-fight-or-flying/ (Accessed June 11, 2019)

[6] Walzer, Michael. 'But and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations.' Basic books, (1977)

[vii] Fisher, David. "Morality and war: Can war be just in the 20-first century?" Oxford Scholarship Online, (2011)  DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599240.001.0001 p66

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Periodical of Political Philosophy 14, no. 4 (2006): 377-393.

[xi] Moussa, Jasmine. "Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the separation of the two bodies of constabulary."International Review of the Cherry-red Cross 90, no. 872 (2008): 963-990.

[12] Walzer, Michael. 'But and unjust wars: A moral statement with historical illustrations.' Basic books, (1977)

[thirteen] Ibid

[xiv] Ibid; p252

[15] Ibid

[16] McMahan, Jeff. 'Killing in war' Oxford Academy Printing, 2009: p95

[17] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Journal of Political Philosophy xiv, no. 4 (2006): p393

[18] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Periodical of Political Philosophy 14, no. 4 (2006): p377-393.

[xix] Ibid

[xx] McMahan, Jeff. 'Killing in war' Oxford University Press, 2009: p95

[21] Walzer, Michael. 'Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations.' Bones books, (1977): p36

[22] Peterson, Matt 'Did Iraq ever go a just war?' The Atlantic, March 2018 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/iraq-war-ethics/556448/ (Accessed June 8, 2019)

[23]  Ibid "Because conditions are continually changing, whether it'south permissible to continue to fight is always an open up question. And therefore I think of jus ad bellum [questions about the initiation of war] non equally a set of principles to check when initiating a war, but equally a set of principles that has to exist reapplied continually."

[24] Ibid

[25] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Periodical of Political Philosophy 14, no. iv (2006): p390

[26] Frowe, Helen. "The moral status of combatants." In The Ideals of War and Peace. Routledge, (2013): 123-145.

[27] Ibid: p132

[28] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Journal of Political Philosophy fourteen, no. iv (2006): 377-393.

[29] Ibid

[xxx] Walzer, Michael. 'Just and unjust wars: A moral statement with historical illustrations.' Bones books,(1997)

[31] Montrose, Jeff. "Unjust War and a Soldier's Moral Dilemma."Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 4 (2013): p333.

[32] Montrose, Jeff. "Unjust War and a Soldier's Moral Dilemma."Periodical of Military Ethics 12, no. 4 (2013): 325-340

[33] Pemberton, Joanne Claire. "Defence of the Realm: Conscription and Social Contract Theory" The Australian Political Studies Clan Annual Conference, University of Sydney Paper​, (2014) Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2440048 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2440048

[34]  McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no. iv (2006): 377-393

[35] Frowe, Helen. "The moral status of combatants." In The Ideals of State of war and Peace. Routledge, (2013): 123-145.

[36]Ellner, Andrea, Robinson, Paul, Whetham, David "When soldiers say no: Selective conscientious objection in the modern military. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. (2014)

[37] McMahan, Jeff. Killing in war. Oxford University Press, 2009: p95

[38] Fisher, David. "Gulf Wars" In 'Morality and war: Can state of war be just in the twenty-first century?' Oxford Scholarship Online (2011):  DOI:ten.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599240.001.0001 p195

[39] Ned Parker, "The Iraq Nosotros Left Behind: Welcome to the Earth's Next Failed Land," Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012): 94-110

[twoscore] Fisher, David. "Gulf Wars" In 'Morality and state of war: Can war be merely in the twenty-first century?' Oxford Scholarship Online (2011):  DOI:ten.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599240.001.0001: p216

[41] Peterson, Matt 'Did Iraq ever get a merely state of war?' The Atlantic, March 2018 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/iraq-war-ethics/556448/ (Accessed June 8, 2019

[42] Walzer, Michael. 'Arguing near war' Yale University Press, (2004).

[43] Fisher, David. "Gulf Wars" In 'Morality and war: Can war be just in the xx-first century?' Oxford Scholarship Online (2011): DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599240.001.0001: p216

[44] May, Larry. 'Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War' European Journal of International Law, 24, no. ane (2013): 315–333

[45] Salon Staff "Prosecutions and Convictions: A look at accountability to date for abuses at Abu Ghrarib and in the broader 'war on terror'" Salon, March, 2006 https://world wide web.salon.com/2006/03/14/prosecutions_convictions/ (Accessed June 10, 2019)

[46] Ibid

[47] Montrose, Jeff. "Unjust War and a Soldier'due south Moral Dilemma."Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 4 (2013): 325-340

[48] May, Larry. 'Jus Mail service Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War' European Journal of International Law, 24, no. one (2013): 315–333

[49] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Journal of Political Philosophy xiv, no. four (2006): 377-393

[50] 'Republic of iraq Body Count' Conflict Casualties Monitor https://world wide web.iraqbodycount.org/database/ (Accessed June ix, 2019)

[51] Zehfuss, Maja. "Killing civilians: Thinking the practice of war."The British Periodical of Politics and International Relations 14, no. 3 (2012): 423-440.

[52] Walzer, Michael. 'Arguing nearly war' Yale University Press, (2004).

[53] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Journal of Political Philosophy fourteen, no. 4 (2006): 377-393

[54] Laufer, Peter. 'Mission rejected: U.s. soldiers who say no to Iraq' Chelsea Green Publishing, (2006)

[55] Buncombe, Andrew 'Desertion huge problem for US in Iraq war' NZ Herald, May, 2005 https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10126890 (Accessed June 12, 2019)

[56] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Periodical of Political Philosophy fourteen, no. 4 (2006): 377-393

[57] May, Larry. 'Jus Mail Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War' European Journal of International Law, 24, no. 1 (2013): 315–333

[58] Frowe, Helen. "The moral status of combatants." In The Ethics of War and Peace. Routledge, (2013): 123-145.

[59] Ibid

[60] Pemberton, Joanne Claire. "Defence of the Realm: Conscription and Social Contract Theory" The Australian Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Academy of Sydney Paper​, (2014) Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2440048 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2440048

[61] Milburn, Andrew 'Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional' U.South. Regular army, October 2010, https://world wide web.army.mil/article/47175/breaking_ranks_dissent_and_the_military_professional (Accessed June 7, 2019)

[62] Yingling, Paul "A Failure in Generalship' Armed Forces Journal, May, 2007 http://armedforcesjournal.com/a-failure-in-generalship/ (Accessed seven June, 2019)

[63] Milburn, Andrew 'Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Armed forces Professional' U.S. Ground forces, October 2010, https://www.army.mil/article/47175/breaking_ranks_dissent_and_the_military_professional (Accessed June 7, 2019)

[64] Montrose, Jeff. "Unjust War and a Soldier's Moral Dilemma."Journal of Military machine Ideals 12, no. 4 (2013): 325-340

[65] Miller, J. Joseph. "Jus ad bellum and an officer's moral obligations: Invincible ignorance, the Constitution, and Iraq."Social theory and practice xxx, no. 4 (2004): p483

[66] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Journal of Political Philosophy fourteen, no. 4 (2006): 377-393

[67] Deam, Jenny. 'Soldiers' choice: Fight or flight' The Denver Postal service, April, 2007 https://www.denverpost.com/2007/04/13/soldiers-choice-fight-or-flight/ (Accessed June 11, 2019)

[68] McMahan, Jeff. "On the moral equality of combatants."Journal of Political Philosophy fourteen, no. 4 (2006): 377-393

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Written by: Elzanne Bester
Written at: University of Auckland
Written for: Dr Thomas Gregory
Engagement written: June 2019

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Source: https://www.e-ir.info/2019/09/01/can-soldiers-refuse-to-fight-the-limitations-of-just-war-theory/

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